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INTENT V. PRACTICE: 
INCENTIVES AND DISINCENTIVES FOR 
CHILD ABUSE REPORTING BY SCHOOL PERSONNEL 
Jane Rosien* 
Lelia Helms .. 
Carolyn Wanat*** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There is extensive literature on child abuse and state law 
reporting requirements for school personnel. This literature 
focuses primarily on descriptions of reporting mandates and on 
reviews of the caselaw resulting from instances of abuse 
occurring in school settings. 1 The reporting laws, however, 
were originally intended to facilitate identification by school 
personnel of the broader problem of abuse and neglect arising 
in home settings.2 Lawmakers viewed teachers, by virtue of 
their daily intensive contact with students, as being well 
positioned to observe and report evidence of abuse by parents 
or adults responsible for the care of children. To date, there has 
been little discussion in education literature about the 
problems that schools encounter in identifying abuse occurring 
in home settings. Instead, most analyses describe problems of 
abuse occurring in school settings by school personnel or other 
* Jane Rosien is a doctoral student in Planning, Policy and Leadership 
Studies at The University of Iowa. She has an M.A. in higher education and a 
J.D. 
** Lelia Helms is an Associate Professor in Planning, Policy and Leadership 
Studies at The University of Iowa. She has a Ph.D. in political science and a J.D. 
*** Carolyn Wanat is an Assistant Professor in Planning, Policy and Leadership 
Studies at The University of Iowa. She has a M.A. in English and a Ph.D. in 
Educational Administration. 
1. For a helpful overview see William F. Foster, Child Abuse in Schools: The 
Statutory and Common Law Obligations of Educators, 4 EDUC. & L. J. 1 (1992); 
Frederica K. Lombard et al., Identifying the Abused Child: A Study of Reporting 
Practices of Teachers, 63 U. DET. L. REV. 657 (1986); Ruth V. Siegel, Comment, 
Failure to Report Suspected Child Abuse: Potential Civil Rights Liability (or School 
Districts, 34 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. (1986); Richard G. Salmon & M. David 
Alexander, Comment, Child Abuse and Neglect: Implications (or Educators, 28 
WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 9 (1985) [hereinafter Salmon & Alexander]; Eric S. 
Mondschein, Legal Responsibility of Educators in Child Abuse, in SCHOOL LAW 
UPDATE: PREVENTIVE SCHOOL LAW 36 (Jones, Semler, eds., 1984); Sanford N. Katz 
et al., Ll!gal Research on Child Abuse and Neglect: Past and Future, 11 FAM. LAW 
Q. 151 (1977). 
2. Marjorie R. Freiman, Notes, Unequal and Inadequate Protection Under the 
Law: State Child Abuse Statutes, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 243 (1982). 
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students. This review examines the effects of the statutes and 
caselaw which encourage or discourage reporting of abuse by 
teachers and administrators. The analysis focuses primarily on 
distinguishing between school personnel as reporters of abuse 
and neglect in the home and as reporters of abuse within the 
school. Cases addressing abuse committed in the home are the 
primary source of data. Cases arising from abuse committed by 
school personnel are included where the distinctions and 
underlying differences in incentive structures facilitate 
analysis. This review will first outline federal and state 
legislative responses to the societal problem of child 
maltreatment. An analysis of the problem of effective 
enforcement of the reporting laws in education and a review of 
the pertinent caselaw will follow. Discussion of the implications 
for implementation and possible reform builds upon these 
findings. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Since 1962, all states, Washington D.C., Puerto Rico and 
the Virgin Islands have enacted child abuse reporting statutes. 
The statutes have undergone a three-phase evolution - (1) 
mere identification of the abused child; (2) identification 
succeeded by an investigation to authenticate the claim; and (3) 
identification, investigation, and intervention to the extent 
necessary to prevent further abuse and still support the family 
unit.3 The articulated purpose of state child abuse reporting 
statutes is to protect children, not to punish those who mistreat 
them.4 The realization that state child protection laws were 
not working led to further reform.5 In 1974 the Child Abuse 
Prevention and Treatment Act was signed into federal 
legislation.6 The Act provides incentives for states to amend 
their reporting statutes to comply with federal requirements by 
providing financial assistance to states that had programs in 
place for child abuse and neglect identification, prevention, and 
3. ld. at 252. 
4. Id. 
5. Douglas J. Besharov, Behind Closed Doors, 3 FAM. ADvoc. 3, 4 (1980) 
(citing downfalls in the existing agencies and evidence of inadequate procedures for 
dealing with the pervasive problem of implementing a child protection system, 
including loss of information and unreasonable delays). 
6. Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
5101-5106 (1988)). 
__j 
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treatment. 7 The costliness of child protection programs made 
some financial assistance almost a necessity. Federal 
requirements for financial assistance mandate specific 
guidelines for the reporting process. These include: reporting of 
known and suspected instances of child abuse or neglect; 
provisions immunizing reporters from prosecution; prompt 
investigation upon receipt of the mandated report to determine 
its accuracy and to implement necessary protection for the 
child; evidence of administrative procedures, personnel, 
training procedures, facilities, and multidisciplinary programs 
or services being in effect; preservation of confidentiality of all 
records to protect the rights of the child, parents, and guardian; 
cooperation of law officials, courts, and state human services 
agencies; appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the 
child in legal proceedings; assurance of funding equal to the 
funding in 1973, appropriate use of federal funds, and an 
increase of state funding where possible; public dissemination 
of related information; and, where feasible, extension of 
preferential treatment to parental organizations combating 
child abuse.8 
The National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect created 
the 1974 Act and developed a Model Child Protection Act9 that 
states have used for guidance in developing statutes and 
policies. The Model Act includes a concise, working definition of 
child abuse and neglect: 
... child abuse and neglect means the physical or mental injury, 
sexual abuse, negligent treatment, or mistreatment of a child under 
the age of eighteen by a person who is responsible for the child's 
welfare under circumstances which indicate that the child's health 
or welfare is harmed or threatened thereby, as determined in 
accordance with regulations prescribed by the Secretary.10 
Additional federal legislation included amending the Social 
Security Act in 1975 to require states receiving federal social 
service grants to provide protective services for physically 
abused children. 11 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 5104(a)-(b)(l) (1988). 
8. 42 u.s.c. § 5102(b)(2) (1988). 
9. 42 U.S.C. § 5112 (1988) [hereinafter Model Act]. 
10. 42 U.S.C. § 5102 (1988). 
11. Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 2337 (1974) (codified as amended in 42 
u.s.c. 5101-06 (1988)). 
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The fundamental component of state abuse and neglect 
statutes is the identification of a cadre of professionals to 
function as mandatory reporters of suspected or known child 
abuse or neglect. Statutes name physicians, nurses, surgeons, 
medical examiners or coroners, dentists, osteopaths, 
optometrists, chiropractors, podiatrists, school teachers and 
officials, police, peace or law enforcement officers, social 
workers, and day care personnel as reporters. 12 As a group of 
non-medical reporters, uniquely positioned to observe and 
monitor children through consistent and continuing interaction, 
teachers are of special interest to this review. 13 Forty-nine 
states have included school teachers and officials as mandatory 
reporters; Vermont includes school teachers in a category of 
permissible reporters. 14 Reports by all persons who know or 
have reasonable cause to suspect child abuse or neglect are 
generally accepted by most states, regardless of the reporter's 
nonmandated status. 
Ill. LIMITED EFFECTIVENESS OF STATUTES 
Despite the federal requirements, financial incentives, and 
Model Act guidance, state child abuse reporting laws are still 
ineffective as a means to protect children through identification 
by mandatory reporters, investigation, and intervention. 15 
Possible explanations for this limited compliance by school 
personnel include: (1) the ambiguities and vagueness of 
individual state statutes, (2) the lack of incentives for 
mandated reporters to report suspected or known instances of 
child abuse or neglect, and (3) the dynamics of school settings 
which may deter reporting by teachers under the statutes. 
A. Statutory Ambiguity 
Three areas of statutory ambiguity may lead to ineffective 
reporting: (1) the definitions of "abuse" and "neglect"; (2) the 
12. Salmon & Alexander, supra note 1, at 13. 
13. Nadine Abrahams et al., Teachers' Knowledge, Attitudes and Beliefs About 
Child Abuse and Its Prevention, 16 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 229-38 (1992); Garry 
Baxter & John Beer, Educational Needs of School Personnel Regarding Child Abuse 
and/or Neglect, 67 Pi'>'YCHOL. REP. 75 (1990) [hereinafter B~ter & Beer]; Jody 
Aaron, Note, Civil Liabilitv for Teacher's Negligent Failure to Report Suspected 
Child Abuse, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 183, 184 (1981). 
14. Salmon & Alexander, supra note 1, at 13. 
15. Model Act, supra note 9, § 6 commentary. 
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identification of an abuser; and (3) the degree of certainty 
necessary to sustain a report of abuse or neglect. The contents 
of the report, the methods of reporting, the agency to which the 
report should be made, and the immunization of the reporter 
from prosecution are fairly well-defined and generally 
understood elements of most state statutes. Other than the 
succinct defmition offered by the Model Act, there are no 
universal definitions of abuse or neglect upon which mandatory 
reporters can prudently rely. "Child abuse" was originally 
defmed by the diagnostic term "battered child syndrome," a 
medical term which gained common understanding in the 
1960s.16 Today, the definition of "child abuse" is construed 
more broadly, including elements of physical injury, mental or 
emotional injury, sexual molestation, and neglect. Some states 
have chosen to define "child abuse" in this manner in order to 
allow case-by-case determinations based upon subjective 
criteria. 17 All states define "child abuse" to include physical 
injury, but a few do not include sexual abuse, 18 emotional 
abuse, 19 or neglect20 in their definitions. 
Another ambiguity in many statutes is the identity of the 
abuser. Whether or not the injury or omission must result from 
a specific person's actions depends upon the scope of the 
definition as set forth in the particular state statute. Ten states 
include identification of the abuser within the definition of 
abuser.21 In other states reporting is mandatory regardless of 
the perpetrator's identity. Examples of policies identifying 
potential abusers include: "a parent, or other person legally 
responsible for his care or custody of a child less than eighteen 
years old," and mistreated "by a person who is responsible for 
[his] welfare,"22 It is important to note that the expressed 
definitions and guidelines for reporting suspected abuse or 
neglect are not necessarily the same guidelines and standards 
16. Note, Child Mistreatment: An Overview of Current Approaches, 18 J. OF 
FAM. L. 115, 121 (1979-80). 
17. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.44.020(12) (West 1986). 
18. Freiman, supra note 2, at 254 n. 88 (citing New Mexico, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, and Texas). 
19. ld. at 254, n. 87 (citing Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Maryland, Minnesota, 
Oregon, and Wisconsin). 
20. ld. at 254, n. 89 (citing Idaho). 
21. Alan Sussman, Reporting Child Abuse: A Review of the Literature, 3 Fam. 
L. Q. 245, 257 (1974). 
22. ld. at 257. 
l 
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that will be used in the final determination of whether or not 
the abuse or neglect actually occurred. 23 
Finally, the degree of certainty required of a reporter is 
customarily codified. In general, there are two different 
standards: objective and subjective. An objective standard 
refers to "what the reasonable man in similar circumstances 
would believe to be the case, whether or not the individual in 
question actually formed the belief."24 The statutory language 
establishing an objective standard may contain terms such as 
"reasonable cause to believe," "cause to believe," or "reason to 
believe or suspect."25 The Model Act employs an objective 
standard by requiring reporting if one "knows or has 
reasonable cause to suspect that abuse or neglect has 
occurred.'126 A subjective standard requires only that the 
individual reporting the abuse or neglect form the requisite 
suspicion to report. States employing the subjective standard 
use statutory language such as "the observer believes" or "the 
observer suspects.''27 The distinction between these two 
standards may potentially determine liability in a civil action 
brought against a mandatory reporter for failure to report. 
B. Reporting Incentives 
Immunity from legal action is the primary incentive states 
provide to encourage mandatory reporters to comply with their 
statutory duty to report. The rationale for this policy is to deter 
the possibility of legal entanglement from the reporter's 
perspective. All states, the District of Columbia, the Virgin 
Islands, and Puerto Rico have protected mandatory and 
voluntary reporters from civil or criminal liability for all acts 
required or permitted by the particular statute.28 This 
immunity only applies, however, to those reporters acting in 
23. ALAN SUSSMAN & DAVID COHEN, REPORTING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: 
GUIDELINES FOR LEGISLATION 14, 15 (1975). 
24. Freiman, supra note 2, at 258 n. 125 (citing as examples North Carolina, 
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming). 
25. ld. at 25R. 
26. Model Act, supra note 9, at § 5 commentary. 
27. Freiman, supra note 2, at 258 n. 125 (citing as examples Iowa and Rhode 
Island); Aaron, supra note 13 (citing as examples Alabama, California, Delaware, 
and New Mexico). 
28. ld. at 263 n. 168 (citing as examples Arizona, Florida, and Indiana). 
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good faith. 29 The Model Act also contains similar good faith 
immunity provisions. 30 
Additionally, most state statutes impose penalties for 
knowing and willful failures to report. The majority of state 
statutes classify the failure to report as a criminal 
misdemeanor punishable by up to one year in jail, maximum 
$1000 fme, or both.31 The imposition of criminal sanctions for 
neglect of a duty requiring such extensive personal judgment 
has been criticized as unduly harsh.32 The risk of criminal 
prosecution, however, encourages reporting by offsetting the 
"psychological barriers" presented by the feeling of acting as an 
informant.33 A minority of states provide for only civil 
penalties and some states provide for both civil and criminal 
penalties.34 Additionally, a "failure to report" may result in 
civil liability imposed by applying either statutory negligence or 
common law theories.35 To establish a case of statutory 
negligence the plaintiff must prove that the mandated reporter: 
(1) had a legal duty to report the abuse or neglect, (2) breached 
that legal duty, (3) the failure to report was causally connected 
to the resulting harm claimed, and ( 4) there was injury or 
damage.36 Caselaw also adds to incentives for compliance. For 
example, in Aigner v. Cass School Township37 the appellate 
court held that substantial evidence of a teacher's failure to 
report a suspected case of child abuse immediately was an 
appropriate factor to consider when deciding whether or not to 
terminate the teacher's employment contract. Exposure to civil 
liability arguably strengthens existing reporting schemes. 
Courts may be more willing to impose civil sanctions rather 
than criminal penalties, thus the fear of liability would still 
compel compliance.38 Additionally, the risk of civil liability 
may operate as a financial deterrent to noncompliance as well 
29. ld. 
30. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(A) (1988). 
31. Arthur Schwartz & Harold Hirsh, Child Abuse arul Neglect: A Survey of the 
Law, 28 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 293, 311 (1982). 
32. ld. 
33. ld. 
34. Freiman, supra note 2, at 261. 
35. Aaron, supra note 13, at 191-207 (giving a full discussion of the 
establishment of civil liability through statutory and common law theories of 
negligence). 
36. ld. at 195-207. 
37. 577 N.E.2d 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). 
38. Rowine H. Brown & Richard B. Truitt, Civil Liability in Child Abuse Cases, 
54 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 753, 762 (1978). 
l 
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as a means to pay for some of the injuries to the "abused 
child."39 
C. Dynamics of School Settings 
Despite the strong public interest in reporting, studies 
confirm that teachers remain reluctant to file reports of known 
or suspected child abuse or neglect,40 and when they do file 
reports, teachers oftentimes do not follow procedures specified 
in the statutesY A Virginia study found that of the four 
major groups reporting suspected child abuse or neglect e.g., 
friends and neighbors, anonymous persons, relatives, public 
school teachers; teachers, the only mandatory group of 
reporters, contributed the smallest portion of reports (10%).42 
A Kansas study found that elementary teachers were more 
likely than high school teachers to suspect and report child 
abuse, but that they would report abuse to school officials 
rather than to the official reporting agency.43 Almost one-half 
of reported abuse cases involved school age children, but only 
twelve percent of reports filed were by school personnel.44 
A more extensive study from Michigan confirmed these 
phenomena.45 The "failure to report problem" is twofold, first, 
teachers seldom report and second, when they report, it is not 
done in the legally prescribed manner. Teachers acknowledged 
that in cases where they failed to report to the proper 
authorities, abuse had been observed, but was purposefully not 
reported.46 The Michigan study sought to discriminate 
between the types of abuse more likely to be reported by 
teachers. Nonaccidental physical injuries, the most frequent 
form of abuse, constituted the largest group of unreported, but 
39. !d. 
40. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR PROTECTING CHILDREN, HIGHLIGHTS OF OFFICIAL 
CHILD NEGLECT AND ABUSE REPORTING, 1986 (1988); WE&'TAT ASSOCIATES, STUDY 
OF THE NATIONAL INCIDENCE AND PREVALENCE OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 
(1988); Lanthan D. Camblin, Jr. & H. Thompson Preut, School Counselors and the 
Reporting of Child Abuse: A Survey of State Laws and Practices, 30 SCH. COUNS. 
35R (1983). 
41. Abrahams et al., supra note 13; Baxter & Beer, supra note 13. 
42. VIRGINIA DIVISION FOR CHILDREN, CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN VIRGINIA, 
(1983). 
43. Richard J. Shoop & Lynn M. Firestone, Mandating Reporting of Suspected 
Child Abuse: Do Teachers Obey the Law? 46 WEST'S EDUC. L. REP. 111fi (19RR). 
44. !d. at n. 21. 
45. Lombard et a!., supra note 1. 
46. !d. at 667. 
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observed, cases (10.9%).47 "In contrast, none of the thirty 
mental injury cases (0%), two of eighty-one mistreatment cases 
(2.5%), and three of eighty-six neglect cases went unreported 
(3.5%)."48 This result may appear to be counter-intuitive, and 
bears further investigation. The reasons given by teachers who 
admitted their failure to report included: fear of reprisals to the 
child (thirty-five percent), a feeling the reporting would not 
help (thirty-one percent), and opposition to invading family 
privacy (ten percent).49 
Research also shows that teachers fail to comply with 
statutory procedures for reporting. The Michigan study 
revealed that approximately sixty-six percent (87/131) of the 
teachers surveyed reported observations of abuse or neglect to 
other individuals in their schools and approximately fifty-nine 
percent (77/132) reported only to their school principal or 
assistant principal.50 Department of Social Services statistics 
supported the same finding--four times as many reports are 
filed by principals as teachers.51 This practice was in clear 
violation of the reporting statutes as they were written and 
intended to be implemented. 
IV. EDUCATIONAL INCENTIVES 
INFLUENCING REPORTING 
Beyond the reasons set forth in the research, other societal, 
organizational, and educational disincentives for reporting may 
be identified. Foremost, individual perceptions of the child-
parent relationship, particularly the parameters of appropriate 
discipline, vary greatly. Many teachers hold a stereotype of 
"benevolent parenthood" that prohibits them from admitting 
the fact that parents do abuse their children.52 On a broader 
scale, privacy values may play some role. Freedom from state 
intervention into any aspect of one's life is a highly held 
American value. Many teachers believe in the rights of parents 
to discipline their children and are not sure about the role of 
the school to intrude in this private family matter. 53 Filing a 
47. Id. at 668. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 669. 
50. Id. at 662 
51. ld. at n.22. 
52. EDSEL L. ERICKSON ET AL., CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: A GUIDEBOOK FOR 
EDUCATORS AND COMMUNITY LEADERS (2d ed. 1984). 
53. ld. 
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report necessitates, at a minimum, some resolution of these 
two basic issues by the individual. Others theorize that 
teachers are hesitant to report due to a lack of diagnostic 
expertise. 54 
The professional dynamics of schools may contribute to the 
reluctance of teachers to report. Cooperative parent-school 
relationships are a cornerstone of successful education. School 
administrators, especially principals, strive to create and 
maintain positive relations. Teachers' positive interactions with 
parents help establish successful school-family relations. 
Teachers commonly express anxieties about dealing with 
parents55 since they must interact with parents in multiple 
contexts (e.g., parent-teacher conferences, extracurricular 
activities, and other school events). Teachers may fear 
confrontation with an allegedly abusive parent, especially since 
most teachers are personally concerned for the sake of the 
child's long-term educational prospects. 
In smaller school districts, these dynamics may be further 
compounded by factors of scale. Involvement in community 
activities presents many opportunities for face-to-face 
exchanges. Additionally, the teacher may have personal 
acquaintance with the parent who is implicated and not want 
to report a "friend." Teachers may often be dissuaded by the 
belief that the abuse is an isolated incident which will not 
happen again. 
Research confirms these dissuading factors. Teachers 
attribute their reluctance to report to a lack of community 
support and feelings of isolation, particularly in small 
communities.56 Working with a child and parent after a report 
has been made also is difficult for a teacher and, in some cases, 
causes teachers to fear reprisals.57 Complying with mandatory 
reporting is particularly difficult for a teacher if the principal is 
reluctant to report. 58 Some principals are reluctant to risk a 
54. Salmon & Alexander, supra note 1, at 14. 
55. JOSEPH BLASE, THE POLITICS OF LIFE IN SCHOOLS 199 (1991). 
56. Abrahams et al., supra note 13; Bonnie Trudell & Marianne H. Whatley, 
School Sexual Abuse Prevention: Unintended Consequences and Dilemmas 12 CHILD 
ABUSE & NEGLECT 113 (1988); J. Patrick Turbett & Richard O'Toole, Teachers' 
Recognition and Reporting of Child Abuse, 53 J. OF SCH. HEALTH 605 (1983). 
57. Abrahams et al., supra note 13; J.D. Alfaro, Impediments to Mandated 
Reporting of Suspected Child Abuse and Neglect in New York City (Unpublished 
paper presented at the Seventh National Conference on Child Abuse and Neglect 
(Chicago, IL 1985)). 
58. Cynthia C. Tower, How SCHOOLS CAN HELP COMBAT CIDLD ABUSE AND 
NEGLECT 52 (1987) (a pamphlet published by the NEA); Abrahams et al., supra 
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negative image of their schools for having reported suspected 
abuse.59 The organization of schools may also impede 
reporting. Schools are governed by lay boards which are 
dependent in many respects upon public support and goodwill 
for resources. The various levels of hierarchy within the 
schools, along with the degree of specialization among teachers 
and other staff may serve as environmental buffers. Teachers 
report to an assistant principal or principal, a district 
superintendent, a school board, and perhaps even the state 
department of education. In addition, numerous specialists' 
roles support the teaching function. Counselors, social workers, 
school nurses, and special education teachers provide 
assistance and service coordination for classroom teachers. 60 
The mandate to report an instance of child abuse or 
neglect directly and independently to an external agency 
creates countervailing pressures for teachers as to whom they 
owe a duty, whom they are bound to inform, and in what order 
this must be effectuated. The mandate for teachers to report 
directly to an outside agency conflicts with an environment 
where the culture requires cooperative staffing between 
multiple specialists to address the problems of an individual 
student. This environment may also predispose toward a ''let 
someone else report" attitude,61 especially in a system where a 
number of "mandatory reporters" have contact with the child. 
In contentious areas, consultation and confirmation by 
colleagues may be preferred before action is taken. 
Yet, state statutes clearly denote that oral reports are to be 
given directly and immediately to the designated social service 
agency, followed by a written documentation of the report. 
Several policy arguments support this method of reporting. 
Social service agency personnel possess the expertise, training 
and qualifications to assess the validity of reports. Such 
expertise is also necessary to determine when and to what 
extent intervention is appropriate. If certain services are 
deemed necessary, the social service agency also can provide 
these directly. The filing of a claim with social service agencies 
requires a formal investigation of all relevant facts. The social 
note 13; Cynthia C. Tower, CIDLD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: A TEACHER'S HANDBOOK 
FOR DETECTION, REPORTING AND CLASSROOM MANAGEMENT 32 (1984). 
59. Tower, 1984 & 1987, supra note 58, at 33 (1984) and 51-52 (1987). 
60. Tower (1984), supra note 58, at 38. 
61. Pat Alford et al., A Profile of the Physical Abusers of Children, 33 SCH. 
CoUNS. 143 (1985). 
l 
I 
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service agencies have access to the state abuse registries if they 
exist in the jurisdiction of 'concern,62 and are positioned to 
make more informed judgments about the extent of, and 
appropriate response to, the abuse. 
Allowing school principals or other administrative officials 
to perform a "screening'' function before filing reports may be 
imprudent for several reasons. First, principals are subject to 
many of the same pressures affecting teachers. Second, they 
bear administrative responsibility for maintaining good 
relationships with parents in their attendance areas. One false 
or unfounded report can generate parental ire and community 
disapproval as well as pose risks to careers in the politicized 
environment of local schools. Finally, a principal also lacks the 
first-hand knowledge and sensitivity to behavioral changes of 
the student that the teacher holds.63 The need for certainty 
and, in some jurisdictions, identification of the abuser may 
deter the filing of reports. 
There is another perspective, however, on the question as 
to which agency should receive reports of abuse. The option of 
"gradual reporting" by teacher to administrator and 
administrator to agency may remove barriers enough to be 
more effective in the long run. By reporting to the 
administrator, a teacher may face less personal risk of a 
confrontation with a hostile parent. The administrator, in turn, 
acts as a protective buffer for teachers in performing their 
mandated duty. The teacher may not have to be identified as 
the reporter in the formally filed complaint. The chance of 
criminal or civil liability may be decreased for the teacher. This 
alternative also may appeal to administrators as well. If 
administrators are given responsibility to determine whether or 
not to report to the social service agency, they may exercise 
review authority while still facing the possible threat of legal 
liability. He/she may be no more plagued with risk than in the 
current system, yet may feel better able to anticipate the 
consequences. 64 
62. Freiman, supra note 2; Schwartz & Hirsh, supra note 31. 
63. Lombard et al., supra note 1, at 662-5 (giving a more comprehensive 
discussion of reasons for not having principals "screen" reports). 
64. ld. 
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V. UTIGATION OVER REPORTING 
The threat of legal liability is often understood to operate 
as the primary incentive for abiding by the law. However, this 
threat means little without follow-through. The imposition of 
liability provides an incentive structure for compliance. To 
date, this has been a missing link in the effective 
implementation of child abuse reporting laws as they pertain to 
school teachers and administrators reporting the abuse and 
neglect of children in their home settings. 
A WESTLA WS5 search for all reported state and federal 
decisions involving a claim against a school teacher or 
administrator for the failure to report child abuse or neglect 
was conducted. The query66 retrieved eighty-six state and 
eighteen federal cases. Only one reported case in which school 
officials were being sued for their failure to report abuse 
committed by parents, or someone in a home setting, was 
directly on point. 67 Eleven others addressed issues of 
reporting related to the administration or effect of the statute. 
Of the cases identified, only five involved abuse arising in a 
home setting. The other seven alleged abuse occurring in the 
school setting including one which addressed the ancillary 
problem of disclosure under the public records statutes. 
Table 1 
Caselaw: Failure to Report Child Abuse 
ABUSE IN HOME 
(n=5) 
FAILURE TO REPORT 
Mattingly 
IMMUNITY-RETALIATION 
Dunajewski 
Jenkins 
Landstrom 
Mattingly 
McDonald 
ABUSE IN SCHOOL 
(n=7) 
Bellevue 
Grover 
Pesce 
Aigner 
Bellevue 
Cromley 
Pesce 
65. West Publishing's on-line legal research database. 
66. "'failure to report' 'failure to comply' /p 'child abuse' neglect/25 Child!" 
67. Mattingly v. Casey, 509 N.E.2d 1220 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987). 
l 
l 
102] CHILD ABUSE REPORTING 
INDIRECT REPORTING 
Dunajewski 
Landstrom 
Mattingly 
WHO SUES 
DISCLOSURE 
* false report 
PARENTS 
Dunajewski* 
Jenkins* 
Landstrom* 
Mattingly 
McDonald* 
Bernstein 
Cromley 
PROSECUTOR 
Bernstein 
Grover 
PARENTS 
Bellevue 
EMPLOYEES 
Aigner 
Cromley 
Pesce 
South Coast Newspapers 
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The twelve cases reflect many of the problems identified in 
the prior discussion of the reporting statutes. These include 
litigation over five basic issues: failure to report, immunity for 
reporting and from other forms of retaliation, indirect reporting 
or reporting to a non-designated agency, identifying who may 
sue, and disclosure. 
A. Failure to Report 
Four cases directly or indirectly addressed the alleged 
failure of school personnel to report abuse. These cases 
illustrate a range of variance in the laws. One case68 involved 
a failure to report which resulted in the prosecution of a 
principal under the criminal misdemeanor provisions of the 
reporting statute. The other three addressed the limits of 
permissible delay or degree of certainty necessary before filing 
a report. 69 One case involved allegations of abuse committed 
68. State v. Grover, 437 N.W.2d 60 (Minn. 1989). 
69. Mattingly, 509 N.E.2d at 1220; Pesce v. Sterling Morton High Sch., 830 
F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1987); Bellevue Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 405 v. Benson, 707 P.2d 137 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1985). 
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in the home setting,70 while the other three dealt with abuse 
occurring in the school. 71 
The issue of determining what constituted abuse subject to 
the reporting laws was at the core of two cases. One case 
directly addressed a claim that school personnel had failed to 
report abuse under the statute's criminal penalties for 
nonreporting. 72 The alleged abuse in this case was committed 
by teachers and illustrates the difficulty of defining an 
appropriate, commonly understood standard of abuse 
particularly when allegations are somewhat vague and against 
subordinate employees. The question involved discerning 
possible sexual abuse from discipline by an elementary teacher 
who was alleged to have "pinched [a student] on the buttocks 
on two occasions, . . . having squeezed the buttocks of [a 
student] . . . having choked [a student] in class and in the 
bathroom, ... and having patted [a student] on the buttocks as 
she was leaving the classroom.'m The parents of the two 
students involved contacted the social services reporting agency 
after complaining to the principal, who decided not to act upon 
the allegation. The principal's constitutional challenge to his 
subsequent conviction for failing to report was based upon 
grounds of statutory vagueness and overbreadth, but was 
denied by the court. The second case involved similar 
allegations of abuse arising in the school setting by school 
employees and the degree of certainty necessary to require 
filing a report. A principal was demoted for not reporting abuse 
described to him by a school custodian. The custodian told the 
principal that a sixth-grade girl had said that she had had 
sexual intercourse with another custodian two days earlier. The 
girl told no other school personnel about the incident. Based on 
the unconfirmed, secondhand nature of the complaint, the 
principal filed no formal report. 74 
The remaining two cases further illustrate issues arising 
from the degree of latitude in reporting accorded to school 
personnel both as to the timeliness and the evidence of abuse. 
Mattingly involved a claim of negligence against school 
personnel, including a teacher, school nurse, and a principal, 
70. Mattingly, fi09 N.E.2d at 1220. 
71. Grover, 437 N.W.2d at 60; Pesce, 830 F.2d at 789; Benson, 707 P.2d at 137. 
72. Grover, 437 N.W.2d at 60. 
73. ld. at 60. 
74. Bellevue Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 405 v. Benson, 707 P.2d 137 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1985). 
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for failure to report abuse in a timely fashion. School personnel 
had observed at least sixteen instances of bruises and cuts in 
the same pupil over a two year period but had accepted the 
step-mother's explanations for each and had not filed a report. 
The school nurse finally filed a report two months before the 
pupil suffered a fatal beating. The court found that the actions 
of the personnel did not violate their duty to report under the 
statutes since the officials could exercise some judgment as to 
whether each instance of bruises and cuts constituted abuse 
and since they finally did report. School personnel were 
permitted "to consider the gravity of the child's hurts, what 
they know about [the] family, and what this portended. Section 
51A does not require the reporting of every bruise; it requires 
reporting on the basis of indicators which give reasonable cause 
to believe that a child is being abused."75 
Pesce76 provides an interesting contrast in terms of the 
elapsed time and degree of certainty allowed before filing the 
requisite report. Pesce, a tenured teacher and school 
psychologist/counselor, was disciplined by the school board for 
his ten day delay in failing to report suspected child abuse. The 
court sustained the school district's disciplinary action against 
the counselor for failure to comply with the statute which 
required "prompt" reporting of suspected abuse." 
The facts in Pesce indicated that a male student, upon the 
urging of a worried friend, visited Dr. Pesce for counseling. 
Mter Dr. Pesce assuring the student of the confidentiality of 
their conversations, the student claimed that a teacher had 
shown him pornographic pictures during a visit to his home. 
Although he denied any sexual acts during the encounter with 
the teacher and any resultant suicidal intentions, the student 
indicated confusion and concern over his own sexual 
preference. Ten days later, after two additional and one 
cancelled meeting, the student revealed to Dr. Pesce and a 
professional therapist that the encounter with the teacher had, 
in fact, involved sexual contact. At that point Dr. Pesce, with 
the student's consent, reported the incident to the 
superintendent and the responsible social services agency. The 
elapsed time period between initial suspicion of suspected 
abuse and confirmation by the victim was ten days. 
75. Mattingly v. Casey, 509 N.E.2d 1220 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987). 
76. Pesce v. Sterling Morton High Sch., 830 F.2d 789 (7th Cir. 1987). 
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B. Immunity I Retaliation 
The most commonly litigated issue in the cases involved 
immunity for reporting. In the cases identified in this search 
immunity had two components: immunity from legal liability 
for the act of reporting; and immunity from resulting changes 
in employment status. The former arose from state law 
provisions giving protection to reporters for filing reports. The 
latter is generally not addressed in state statutory schemes. 
Immunity does not extend to the employment consequences for 
school personnel of either reporting or failing to report. Five 
cases addressed in some way the scope of immunity from 
liability for reporting. All involved allegations of abuse by 
parents or persons in the home setting. All sustained the 
immunity of school personnel for reporting, even when no basis 
for the allegation was later found77 or when delays in 
reporting adversely affected the child. 78 Nor could liability 
under either state or federal civil rights statutes be invoked. 79 
Though limited, the cases on point demonstrate that courts 
sustain the provisions for immunity from suit with some 
regularity. 
As indicated above, state laws providing immunity for 
reporting do not extend to actions taken against school 
personnel in the context of their employment. Four cases dealt 
with what weight either reporting or failing to report could be 
given in subsequent disciplinary actions against school 
personnel. All four cases involved allegations of abuse in the 
school setting. Three cases identified by this research confirm 
that a delay or failure to report may be considered as evidence 
of competence when making a decision is made to renew a 
teacher's contract80 or as a basis for disciplining or demoting 
school personnel. 81 Due process protections must be employed 
in such actions. 82 
77. Jenkins v. Marava, No. CIV A. 89-0284-Z 1990 WL 98048 (D. Mass. June 
29, 1990); Landstrom v. Barrington Sch. Dist., 739 F. Supp. 441 (N.D. Ill. 1990); 
Dunajewski v. Bellmore-Merrick Cent. High Sch., 526 N.Y.S.2d 139 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1988); McDonald v. State, 694 P.2d 569 (Ore. Ct. App. 1985). 
78. Mattingly, 509 N.E.2d at 1220. 
79. Jenkins, 1990 WL at 98048. 
80. Aigner v. Cass Sch. Township, 577 N.E.2d 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). 
81. Pesce v. Sterling Morton High Sch., 830 F.2d 7!'19 (7th Cir. 1987); Bellevue 
Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 405 v. Benson, 707 P.2d 137 (Wash. Ct. App. 19!'15). 
82. Benson, 707 P.2d at 137. 
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The fourth case, however, identified a much more 
problematic fact pattern. Cromley83 involved a charge of 
retaliatory discharge against a school district. Marcella Ann 
Cromley, a teacher, filed a report of abuse directly to the social 
services agency after her principal failed to act upon her 
informing him of the alleged abuse. The abuse alleged in the 
case was committed by another teacher in Cromley's 
department. Cromley learned of the abuse from the student 
directly. Subsequently, Cromley was forbidden to speak to the 
social services worker investigating the report, removed as 
department head, criticized by other faculty for false 
evaluations and criticism, and eventually discharged from 
employment. The reported decision in this case dealt with the 
weight accorded to First Amendment protections in termination 
from employment, and resulted in a motion to dismiss being 
granted to the school district. 
C. Indirect Reporting 
Direct reporting, the requirement that teachers or school 
personnel independently file reports of child abuse with the 
designated child protection agency, is the preferred statutory 
reporting scheme. However, indirect reporting, or the 
consultation and screening of reports through intermediary 
officials, would appear to dominate practice. While the practice 
of indirect reporting was an issue in only two cases,84 all but 
two of the remaining ten cases85 revealed factual patterns in 
which the mandatory reporter either consulted with other 
school personnel or deferred responsibility for reporting to 
another. State statutory provisions, which generally require 
direct reporting to state child protective services, do not appear 
to be followed in practice. The two cases raising this issue did 
not repudiate reliance upon direct reporting. 
In People v. Bernstein,86 the criminal conviction of a school 
district administrator for failure to report child abuse was 
reversed. The administrator had reported an instance of abuse 
to a school police unit rather than to the county agency. The 
83. Cromley v. Board of Educ., 699 F. Supp. 1283 (N.D. Ill. 1988). 
84. Dunajewski v. Bellmore-Merrick Cent. High Sch., 526 N.Y.S.2d 139 (App. 
Div 1988); People v. Bernstein, 243 Cal. Rptr. 363 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 
1987). 
85. State v. Grover, 437 N.W.2d 60 (Minn. 1989); Benson, 707 P.2d at 137. 
86. 243 Cal. Rptr. 363 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1987). 
-
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court held that the school district's police unit constituted a 
"child protective agency" within the meaning of the statute and, 
consequently, the administrator had complied with the 
reporting mandate. 87 
In a second case, Dunajewski, a court found that no libel 
had occurred in a civil suit when, in addition to a report made 
to the child protective agency, the report was sent to the 
school's internal committee responsible for reviewing the needs 
of special education students. The student who was the subject 
of the report had had prior behavioral and academic problems. 
The court determined that the committee constituted an 
"authorized recipient". 88 
Although not a cause of action in the remaining cases, 
problems with reports made to other agencies or school 
personnel were evident in many cases identified in this survey. 
The pattern and practice of school personnel who consulted 
with each other over a two-year period about questions as the 
evidence of child abuse was documented in Mattingly, a case 
discussed earlier.89 Cromley v. Board of Education, 90 a case 
involving the issue of retaliatory discharge, illustrates the 
troublesome conflicts and pressures upon school personnel 
when the screening or referral of reports occurs where the 
alleged abuse is by other teachers or employees. 
Finally, Landstrom91 illustrates additional legal issues 
under Monell92 raised by the conflict between statutory 
requirements for direct reporting to social service agencies by 
mandatory reporters and the actual practice of consultation 
and deferral to administrators' decisions in such matters. In an 
action for damages involving a report of abuse which later 
proved to be unfounded, parents sued a school district rather 
than the teacher. The teacher had reported abuse to her 
principal, who independently evaluated the situation and filed 
a report with the child protective agency. The case was decided 
on a question of whether the school district would be held 
liable for the principal's alleged civil rights violations under 
Monell. Important to the facts, although not crucial to the 
outcome, was the teacher's independent duty under state law to 
87. Bernstein, 243 Cal. Rptr at 365. 
88. Dunajewski, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 139. 
89. Mattingly v. Casey, 509 N.E.2d 1220 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987). 
90. 699 F. Supp. 1283 (N.D. Ill 1988). 
91. 739 F. Supp. 441 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
92. Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 
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report abuse directly. Consultations between teachers and 
administrators prior to reporting may broaden the scope of 
liability for not reporting to include the district as a whole. 
This may result in a transfer of liability to the school district 
as the practice of indirect reporting becomes entrenched. Such 
a practice may benefit plaintiffs in search of deeper pockets. 
The economics of litigation from a plaintiffs perspective creates 
incentives to sue the district in addition to, or instead of, a 
teacher or principal when responsibility for reporting decisions 
can be shown to be attributable to the district. 
D. Who May Sue 
The issue of who may sue to enforce mandatory reporting is 
important to ensure the effectiveness of compliance with the 
statutory mandate. Generally, prosecutors appear to be 
reluctant to initiate criminal action against school personnel for 
their failure to report. Only two cases in this survey involved 
criminal prosecutions. 93 Both cases involved abuse occurring 
in school settings. Only one case directly dealt with a failure to 
report,94 whereas the second dealt with a report filed with the 
wrong agency. 95 
In civil suits, cases where a prosecutor may have opted not 
to pursue criminal sanctions, parents are the party with the 
greatest incentives for suing the alleged abuser, the negligent 
reporter, or the agencies responsible for removing the child 
from the custody of the family. 96 Similarly, when the abuse is 
committed by school personnel, parents have every incentive to 
sue for the failure to report, whether to recover damages or to 
force the district to remove the offending parties. However, in 
cases where the parent or someone in the home setting is the 
perpetrator of the abuse, a civil suit may be impossible in 
practice. In reality, there is no one available with the 
incentives or motivation to sue on behalf of the child for a 
failure to report. Although a guardian ad litem or a social 
service agency has the authority to sue the school, principal, or 
teacher on behalf of the child abused in the home setting when 
there is a failure to report, no evidence that this sanction is 
93. State v. Grover, 437 N.W.2d 60 (Minn. 1989); People v. Bernstein, 243 Cal. 
Rptr. 363 (App. Dep't. Super. Ct. 1987). 
94. Grover, 437 N.W.2d at 60. 
95. Bernstein, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 363. 
96. Brown & Truitt, supra note 39, at 767. 
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employed to enforce the reporting law was found in this survey. 
Although parents filed suits when reports alleging abuse in the 
home setting were later found to be false,97 only one case was 
identified in which a parent sued for a school's delay in 
reporting abuse of his child by her stepmother.98 The court 
rejected the father's attempt to recover damages from the 
school as an unacceptable shifting of responsibility from 
himself, in his capacity as father, present in the home during 
the period when the abuse took place, to public officials. 
E. Disclosure 
A somewhat unrelated case deserves brief 
acknowledgement because of the plausible disincentive it offers 
for enhancing implementation of the mandatory reporting laws. 
In a suit for access to police records by a newspaper, a 
California court of appeals held that the public was entitled to 
access to a copy of the police report of an investigation 
undertaken by officers after an oral complaint from residents 
and parents that the high school principal had failed to report 
an incident of child abuse. While the court imposed guidelines 
and restrictions to protect procedural, constitutional and other 
legal rights, the general right of disclosure allowed under state 
law in this case may further add to the general reluctance of 
school personnel to report. The disincentives to report may be 
magnified by the fact that the report can become public 
knowledge. 99 
VI. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Despite limited evidence, analysis of the caselaw appears to 
confirm many of the critiques of the child abuse reporting 
statutes in educational settings. Very few decisions involving 
the failure of school districts to comply with the reporting 
statutes as to abuse or neglect arising in home settings have 
been reported. The limited case law on failure to report abuse 
97. Jenkins v. Matava, No. CN. A. 89-0284-Z, 1990 WL 98048 (D. Mass. June 
29, 1990); Landstrom v. Barrington Sch. Dist., 739 F. Supp 441 (N.D. Ill. 1990); 
Dunajewski v. Bellmore-Merrick Cent. High Sch., 526 N.Y.S. 2d 139 (App. Div. 
1988); McDonald v. State, 694 P.2d 569 (Ore. Ct. App. 1985). 
98. Mattingly v. Casey, 509 N.E.2d 1220 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) 
(the delay was two years). 
99. South Coast Newspapers v. City of Oceanside, 206 Cal. Rptr. 527 (Ct. App. 
1984). 
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arising in the home may reinforce the general evidence that 
school personnel contribute a relatively small portion of child 
abuse reports which are filed. While the reasons for this are 
not clear, analysis of the few cases in this area sheds some 
light on the incentives and disincentives which may condition 
reporting of abuse arising in home settings. 
Ironically, the caselaw addressing reports of abuse 
occurring in school settings appears with greater frequency and 
receives greater attention in the education literature. Clear 
distinctions emerge in the incentive structures which 
differentiate and motivate the reporting of abuse arising in 
home as opposed to school settings. While encouraging 
reporting of abuse in educational settings may not have been a 
primary reason for the passage of mandatory reporting laws, 
these laws appear to be more successful in identifying and 
addressing an additional source of abuse inflicted upon children 
than in meeting the original goal of reporting abuse occurring 
in home settings. 
This difference between the effect of the reporting statutes 
upon abuse occurring in the home as opposed to school settings 
may be due in part to the design of these statutes as identified 
by this review of the caselaw. Fewer problems appear to arise 
from the statutory ambiguities described in the literature than 
from areas in which the statutes are more clearly defined: the 
provisions for immunity from suit for reporting and the 
mandate for direct rather than indirect reporting by school 
personnel. Each of these problems appears to impact reporting 
differentially and to depend in part upon whether the abuse 
occurred in a home or a school setting. 
The provision for immunity from suit was designed to 
remove the potentially adverse consequence of liability for 
reporting by school personnel. Where false reports of abuse 
arising in the home may have been filed, the cases confirm the 
apparent effectiveness of such immunity. Moreover, in cases of 
false reports, parents who feel wrongly accused may have a 
strong desire to sue. However, providing immunity does not 
reach the problem of the failure of school personnel to report 
abuse occurring in a home setting when that abuse is later 
confirmed. In such cases no one is available to sue on behalf of 
victims of this form of abuse when it is observed but not 
reported by school personnel. While immunity from suit may be 
viewed as facilitating reporting, the reporting statutes do not 
deal effectively with a remedy for, or consequences of, failing to 
report suspected abuse in home settings. The fact that no 
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immunity is available for reporting when adverse consequences 
to employment result would also appear to influence reporting, 
particularly of abuse arising in school settings. Failure to 
report can be used as a criterion for decisions about 
employment issues. This is particularly troublesome when the 
alleged source of abuse is a colleague, a subordinate, or a 
superior. Knowledge of the potential or real consequences upon 
one's employment status may create strong disincentives to 
report, especially when the abuse is inflicted by school 
personnel. Erroneous or unsubstantiated reports about in-
school abuse present even greater exposure to adverse 
employment consequences for school personnel, especially given 
the culture of school organizations which rewards cooperation 
and consensus. Offsetting these disincentives to report, 
however, may be the motivations for suit by a greater number 
of non-school parties based on a failure to report. Both criminal 
prosecutors and, more importantly, parents are motivated to 
monitor a school's failure to report abuse by its own personnel. 
These reasons, along with employee disputes about the adverse 
consequences of their reporting or failure to report, may 
account for the greater frequency of reported caselaw for abuse 
occurring in schools. 
The cases indicated that statutory requirements for direct 
rather than indirect reporting are ignored in practice. While 
the effect of this practice upon reporting of abuse arising in the 
home may be less problematic than upon that in school 
settings, problems remain with screening or consulting prior to 
reporting. Despite teachers' better vantage point in identifying 
cases where the abuse occurs in a home setting, the caselaw 
illustrates their reluctance to report without consulting peers 
or superiors. This may arise from their understanding of the 
consequences of such reports, from personal commitment to the 
continuing welfare of the child, and from their knowledge of the 
services available to support that child within the school. The 
utility of the mandate requiring direct reporting may be 
challenged when noncompliance appears to be widespread and 
to undermine the organizational culture of the school. Problems 
with indirect reporting do not appear to be serious when the 
abuse in question occurs in home settings. There is one caveat 
which must be incorporated into this observation. While 
individuals are immunized from liability, indirect reporting 
may expose school districts to liability under Monell. When a 
pattem of indirect reporting continues, districts may wish to 
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address the policy implications of such liability directly and 
develop appropriate procedures. 
In situations where abuse occurs in school settings or by 
school personnel, indirect reporting may be problematic. Such 
cases necessarily involve an additional layer of complexity -
employment relationships. Consultation prior to the reporting 
of abuse committed by another employee creates conflict 
between school personnel. The disruptions are particularly 
troublesome when a superior does not file a subordinate's 
report. At that point the initial reporter has few acceptable 
options. The consequences to employment status from reporting 
may weigh more heavily than those of not reporting. Only the 
interests of parents in isolating the offender may offset the 
organizational dynamics of this class of situations. 
The basic question remains: how can the social policies 
behind the child abuse reporting laws be transformed by 
schools into effective implementation strategies and successful 
results? Our analysis suggests that an understanding of the 
problems encountered in implementing the mandate for the 
reporting of child abuse by school personnel is enhanced by 
viewing the problem as two separate issues: abuse occurring in 
home settings and abuse occurring in school settings. A clearer 
understanding of the incentive structure which may influence 
reporting by educators emerges from this distinction. So too, 
may the basis for discussion about possible policy and statutory 
reform be expanded. 
Child abuse occurs in many settings. Existing reporting 
statutes do not distinguish between the possible sources of 
abuse and the barriers to reporting in each. Schools must deal 
with abuse inflicted on children both at home and at school. 
The incentives for reporting vary according to setting and need 
to be addressed separately. While some coherency in reform 
may eventually require state legislative action, districts can 
begin to address the policy implications of the issues identified 
in this review at the local level and implement strategies to 
overcome the problems arising from existing reporting statutes. 
